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CAN THE INTERNET KILL?  HOLDING WEB INVESTIGATORS 
LIABLE FOR THEIR CRIMINAL CUSTOMERS 
As the wealth of online information grows, private investigation websites 
are becoming more powerful and popular.  Their client lists include 
attorneys, insurance agencies, banks, neighbors, employers, and, oh yes, 
stalkers and identity thieves.  When a stalker used information from a 
web investigator to track down and kill his victim, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court held the investigator liable for its customer’s criminal 
acts.  This iBrief considers how far liability should extend for a web 
investigator, distinguishes web investigators from handgun and bullet 
retailers, and explains how this decision realizes a policy against privacy 
invasions. 
Introduction 
As the wealth of online information grows every day, so too grows the power and 
popularity of online research and investigation companies.  Benign research tools, like Google, 
freely provide public information, sifting through masses of data to find what customers want 
most.  Others charge for their services, providing a range of public and private information.  
Online information brokers, or “web investigators,” can find anything about a person from an 
unlisted phone number to criminal records to hidden bank accounts.1  Who would want this kind 
of information?  Attorneys looking for hidden assets or “unavailable” witnesses, banks tracking 
down runaway debtors, and suspicious neighbors and employers checking up on “the new guy” 
find these services invaluable.  Unfortunately, web investigators are also treasure chests for 
stalkers and identity thieves! 
One powerful web investigator is Docusearch.com, recently rated “Best of the Web” by 
Forbes magazine.2  “A stalker would kill for the wealth of information [Docusearch co-owner 
Daniel] Cohn was able to dig up,” wrote Adam Penenberg in a separate Forbes cover story that 
showed how invasive Docusearch could be.3  Sadly, that’s exactly what happened.  Two months 
before Forbes published the article, a stalker hired Docusearch to learn the social security number 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., Docusearch.com at http://www.docusearch.com. 
2 Web Site Reviews: Docusearch, Forbes.com, at 
http://www.forbes.com/bow/b2c/review.jhtml?id=1929 (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). 
3 Adam L. Penenberg, The End of Privacy, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 182, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/1129/6413182a.html.  
and employment address of his victim.4  Five weeks later, the stalker went to his victim’s 
workplace and fatally shot her and himself.5 
In February 2003, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found Docusearch civilly liable 
for the criminal acts of its stalker-customer, holding stalking and identity theft to be foreseeable 
risks of selling personal information.6  This iBrief examines that decision and explores the 
following questions: 
• How far should liability extend for a customer’s criminal actions? 
• What distinguishes a web investigator from a handgun or bullet retailer? 
• How does this decision realize a policy against invasions of privacy? 
The Case of Remsburg v. Docusearch 
In 1999, New Hampshire resident Liam Youens contacted Docusearch through its 
website and paid $20 to learn the birth date of Amy Boyer, a woman he was stalking.7  When 
Docusearch returned birth dates for multiple women with that name, Mr. Youens provided 
Docusearch with her home address to narrow the field.8  Mr. Youens, who maintained a website 
about stalking and killing Ms. Boyer, then requested her social security number, which 
Docusearch provided for a $45 fee.9  The next day, Mr. Youens requested Ms. Boyer’s 
employment information.10  After its first attempt failed, Docusearch used a pretextual phone call 
to obtain Ms. Boyer’s employment address, which it passed on to Mr. Youens for $109.11  One 
month later, Mr. Youens drove to Ms. Boyer’s workplace and fatally shot her as she left work.12  
Mr. Youens then killed himself.13 
In February 2003, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found Docusearch liable for the 
criminal acts of its customer Mr. Youens.  Generally in tort law, private citizens have no duty to 
protect someone from the criminal attacks of third parties.14  Therefore, a company generally has 
no duty to foresee the criminal actions of its customers.  However, in special situations, courts 
                                                     
4 Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., No. 2002-255, 2003 N.H. LEXIS 17, at *4-7 (N.H. Feb. 18, 
2003). 
5 Id. at *7. 
6 Id. at *13. 
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find exceptions to this general principle.  Where a party’s conduct creates an unreasonable risk of 
harm from criminal misconduct, the party owes a duty to those foreseeably endangered.15  In this 
case, the court found that Docusearch had “a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third 
person’s personal information to a client.”16  When Docusearch sold Ms. Boyer’s social security 
number and employment address, stalking and identity theft were “sufficiently foreseeable” 
risks.17  Thus, Docusearch was negligent in selling Ms. Boyer’s personal information, and 
Docusearch is liable for the harm that came to her. 
Although this case involves emerging technology, the court’s line of reasoning is 
consistent with traditional tort law.  Section 302B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states an 
act may be negligent if “the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk 
of harm to another,” even through the intentional criminal conduct of a third person.18  “[W]here 
the actor’s own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of 
risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account,” the 
actor has a duty to “anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of 
others.”19  Specifically, negligence may occur “where the actor’s affirmative act is intended or 
likely to defeat a protection which the other has placed around his person or property for the 
purpose of guarding them from intentional interference.”20  Docusearch’s collection and 
distribution of Ms. Boyer’s social security number and employment information defeated her 
privacy protections.  Furthermore, negligence may occur “where property of which the actor has 
possession or control affords a peculiar temptation or opportunity for intentional interference 
likely to cause harm.”21  To a stalker (or an identity thief), the private details of a person’s life are 
extremely tempting, and Docusearch should have realized that when selling Ms. Boyer’s 
information to her stalker. 
Does Information Kill? 
If placed in the wrong hands at the wrong time, the right information can make a big 
difference.  In this case, Docusearch provided a stalker with details of his victim’s life, and, 
without knowing it, contributed to Mr. Youen’s stalking.  However, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court suggests that Docusearch is liable for murder as well.  There is a difference between 
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stalking and murder.  When a customer inquires about a person’s employment information or 
social security number, stalking and identity theft, respectively, may be foreseeable.  Murder, 
however, is a separate and additional crime that is far more serious and less predictable.  Should 
Docusearch be liable for the death of Ms. Boyer?  The court writes, “[n]ot only is stalking itself a 
crime, but it can lead to more violent crimes, including assault, rape or homicide.”22  While this 
may be true, it doesn’t necessarily mean that Docusearch should be liable for every criminal 
action that its customer takes.  At some point, the foreseeability of criminal action wanes, 
especially when customers take separate and additional criminal actions. 
Furthermore, the impact of the information provided by Docusearch is limited.  Mr. 
Youens already possessed his victim’s name, home address, and telephone number.  Docusearch 
provided Ms. Boyer’s social security number and employment information.  The social security 
number, which is harder to obtain without help, is probably the biggest invasion of privacy.  As 
the court writes, “a person may reasonably expect that the [social security] number will remain 
private.”23  However, for purposes of stalking and murder, the social security number is 
irrelevant, and Mr. Youens did not seem to use this information in any way.  The employment 
information, which serves as the causal link between Docusearch and the murder, is much easier 
to obtain.  In fact, the court admits: 
A person’s employment, where he lives, and where he works are 
exposures which we all must suffer.  We have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy as to our identity or as to where we live or work.  Our 
commuting to and from where we live and work is not done 
clandestinely and each place provides a facet of our total identity.24 
Mr. Youens, who was already stalking Ms. Boyer and knew where she lived, could easily have 
followed her to work one day.  Although the murder took place at her workplace, it could easily 
have been at her home or elsewhere.  In other words, Docusearch’s information may have 
facilitated the stalking, but it was probably not a “but for” cause of the murder. 
However, the Remsburg decision is not surprising given the dangers associated with web 
investigation.  In determining the proper scope of a duty and foreseeability, the magnitude of risk 
from an activity must be balanced against the utility of the actor’s conduct.25  Web investigators 
fraudulently obtain information through pretextual phone calls, and then sell it to interested 
customers.  Given the gravity of identity theft and stalking, the risks of web investigators are 
quite high.  Another aspect that makes web investigation so risky is how little investigators know 
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about their customers’ purposes:  Docusearch, for instance, knew nothing substantive about Mr. 
Youens or his purpose.26  In contrast, firearms and ammunitions retailers must perform 
background checks on customers to prevent sales to convicted felons, drug users, the “mentally 
defective,” those convicted of domestic violence, and those with restraining orders for harassing 
or stalking another person.27  In Remsburg, Docusearch phoned Mr. Youens several times during 
their transactions, but never spoke to him for very long or learned his purpose.  Given the power 
of Docusearch to find every intimate detail about a person, it is alarming that they never 
discovered that Mr. Youens “maintained a website containing references to stalking and killing 
[Ms.] Boyer as well as other information and statements related to violence and killing.”28  On the 
website, Mr. Youens wrote: 
Her address was 10 Woodbury Drive she didn't move from home yet, no 
other information was provided in the background check. 
I found an internet site to do that, and to my surprize [sic] everything else 
under the Sun. Most importantly: her current employment. It's accually 
[sic] obsene [sic] what you can find out about a person on the internet. 
I'm waiting for the results.29 
Tragically, the results are now clear, and the obscene danger of selling personal information 
online is, too. 
Meanwhile, the utility of web investigation is low.  Web investigators operate in the 
“netherworld of private eyes, ex-spooks and ex-cops, retired military men, accountants and 
research librarians.”30  “They mine celebrity secrets, spy on business rivals and track down 
hidden assets, secret lovers and deadbeat dads.”31  Although this information may be a helpful 
tool in the hands of banks or law enforcement officials, it is a dangerous weapon in the hands of 
the wrong person.  With low costs, nominal screening, and easy online access, the risks of web 
investigation outweigh the benefits.  Thus, web investigation is a high risk, low utility activity, 
and it is understandable that the New Hampshire Supreme Court extended the scope of 
foreseeability so far for Docusearch. 
Guns Don’t Kill People? 
Docusearch’s information may have indirectly led to Ms. Boyer’s demise, but what about 
the gun and bullets Mr. Youens used to shoot her?  Like the personal information from 
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Docusearch, the gun and bullets were instruments that aided Mr. Youens in his crime.  Surely, the 
manufacture or sale of weapons creates a foreseeable risk of harm to others.  If anything, the gun 
and bullets were more directly involved in the murder.  So if Docusearch is liable for the harm it 
created, why are the companies that made and sold the gun and bullets not liable? 
The sale of firearms and ammunition is a legal activity regulated by the Gun Control 
Act.32  When a retailer sells guns or bullets in accordance with the Act, courts generally do not 
hold the retailer liable for the criminal actions of its customer.33  However, when a retailer sells a 
gun or ammunition in violation of the Act, the retailer may be liable for the criminal actions of its 
customer.34  Where there is no violation of the Act, the criminal use is, by law, unforeseeable.  
Presuming the gun and bullet retailers followed the Gun Control Act in making sales to Mr. 
Youens, they would not have the same duty to protect Ms. Boyer. 
In contrast, Docusearch’s collection and sale of Ms. Boyer’s personal information was 
illegal.  In obtaining the social security from a credit reporting agency without Ms. Boyer’s 
knowledge or permission, Docusearch invaded Ms. Boyer’s privacy.35  Furthermore, by using a 
pretextual phone call to obtain Ms. Boyer’s employment information, Docusearch employed an 
unfair and deceptive practice that violates state law.36  Thus, unlike the gun and bullet retailers, 
Docusearch conducted illegal business, violating its duty and making further criminal action 
foreseeable. 
Does one offensive or criminal action make another foreseeable?  Not necessarily, but 
engaging in illegal business enterprises gives courts a policy incentive to find liability for other 
criminal actions.  In Buczkowski v. McKay, the Michigan Supreme Court found K-Mart, an 
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ammunition retailer, had no duty to protect an innocent bystander from the criminal actions of its 
customer, because the ammunition and sale met state regulations, even though the customer was 
intoxicated during the purchase.37  The court considered the policy implications of its decision: 
Ultimately, whether we should impose a duty on the defendant in this 
case despite the actual lack of foreseeability turns on whether as a matter 
of policy K-Mart should bear the burden of plaintiff’s loss.  We are 
persuaded that the fiction of foreseeability should not be imposed on the 
sellers of ammunition.  The likely result will be to make such products 
unavailable to law-abiding users, or to raise the price of a multitude of 
potentially harmful products as sellers redistribute the cost of potential 
liability to all consumers.38 
In Buczkowski, K-Mart engaged in the legal and regulated business of selling ammunition, and 
the Michigan Supreme Court was reluctant to impose liability on K-Mart as a result.  In 
Remsburg, Docusearch was engaged in the illegal business activity of collecting and selling 
private information, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court had no problem imposing liability 
on Docusearch.  As the Michigan Supreme Court suggests, finding liability in this situation 
creates such an economic burden that it could drive the retailer out of business.39  Thus, where the 
defendant is engaging in illegal business activities, courts are more likely to stretch the 
foreseeability of future criminal actions by customers, and by doing so, create an economic 
obstacle for practicing that business.  
Conclusion 
Web investigators are dangerous because they provide personal information at a low cost, 
with easy online accessibility and nominal screening procedures.  When Docusearch collected 
and sold private information to a stalker, it facilitated a crime that ultimately led to the death of a 
young woman.  The Remsburg decision holds web investigators liable for the full effects of their 
customers’ criminal actions.  Unlike firearm and ammunition retailers, Docusearch committed 
invasive and illegal activities when it obtained and sold Ms. Boyer’s information to Mr. Youens.  
Despite multiple, intentional crimes by Mr. Youens, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held 
Docusearch civilly liable for Ms. Boyer’s death.  The court’s decision aggressively interprets the 
foreseeability element of negligence, but in doing so, realizes a policy against using the Internet 
to invade privacy.  In effect, the Remsburg decision raises the cost of web investigation services, 
creating an economic obstacle for companies like Docusearch.  Even if they remain in business, 
web investigators must now research and screen their customers more intensively.  Adam 
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Penenberg wrote four years ago, “America, the country that made ‘right to privacy’ a credo, has 
lost its privacy to the computer.  But it’s far worse than you think.  Advances in smart data-sifting 
techniques and the rise of massive databases have conspired to strip you naked.”40  Until 
Congress passes more stringent privacy laws, Remsburg may serve as our best defense against 
privacy invasions. 
By: Mark Sweet 
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